《淺談貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘》由會(huì)員分享，可在線閱讀，更多相關(guān)《淺談貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘（9頁珍藏版）》請(qǐng)?jiān)谘b配圖網(wǎng)上搜索。

1、 畢 業(yè) 設(shè) 計(jì)（論 文） 譯文題目： Technical Barriers to Trade 　　　　　 貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘 學(xué)生姓名： 學(xué)　　號(hào)： ?！　I(yè)： 國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)與貿(mào)易 所在學(xué)院： 指導(dǎo)教師： 職　　稱：

2、 2011年 12 月 9 日 貿(mào)易技術(shù)壁壘 摘要 由于技術(shù)壁壘的WTO貿(mào)易協(xié)定（TBT）的生效，各位議員在采用和推廣使用都投入了相當(dāng)大的努力，旨在減少合格評(píng)定中心（CA）有關(guān)的貿(mào)易障礙的措施。到目前為止，我們?cè)贑A領(lǐng)域的具體貿(mào)易促進(jìn)方案的影響的知識(shí)是有限的，其貿(mào)易影響的實(shí)證研究可取的。本研究探討供應(yīng)商的合格聲明（SDOC）對(duì)貿(mào)易流動(dòng)的影響。SDOC制度下的供應(yīng)商自己提供書面保證符合適用的技術(shù)法規(guī)，需要由第三方認(rèn)證的市場(chǎng)，合規(guī)性的成本被假定為小于CA的制度。 本研究側(cè)重于三個(gè)SDOC在歐洲聯(lián)盟從醫(yī)療設(shè)備，電信設(shè)備和機(jī)械行業(yè)引進(jìn)合格的產(chǎn)品的情況下的案

3、例。該文件解釋了使用SDOC的理由，預(yù)期收益和SDOC制度的設(shè)計(jì)特點(diǎn)。定量分析采用了重力場(chǎng)模型，并發(fā)現(xiàn)令人信服的證據(jù)表明在歐盟引進(jìn)的SDOC是一個(gè)影響到歐盟市場(chǎng)的積極進(jìn)口流量的演變的因素。歐盟內(nèi)部的貿(mào)易流動(dòng)和額外中歐經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織國(guó)家的進(jìn)口增加了SDOC資格的無線電和電信設(shè)備和低風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的醫(yī)療設(shè)備，而機(jī)械的結(jié)果含糊不清。最顯著的增加，可見在所有三個(gè)部門，發(fā)現(xiàn)來自非經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家（發(fā)展中國(guó)家）樣品中包括出口到歐盟市場(chǎng)。選擇個(gè)別歐盟成員國(guó)的SDOC的影響分析還表明，影響的程度取決于SDOC取代CA的政權(quán)的性質(zhì)。 產(chǎn)品要求從市場(chǎng)到市場(chǎng)的變化很大，證明適用的要求得到滿足，這是供應(yīng)商的責(zé)任。對(duì)于某些產(chǎn)

4、品，必須有一個(gè)由監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)或認(rèn)可的認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)評(píng)估制造商的整合。對(duì)于其他產(chǎn)品，一個(gè)由供應(yīng)商自己的合格的書面聲明，就足夠了。端點(diǎn)是發(fā)放合格證書或聲明。 世貿(mào)組織技術(shù)性貿(mào)易壁壘協(xié)議規(guī)定，“... ...依照評(píng)估程序，嚴(yán)格比給予足夠信心更實(shí)用，認(rèn)為產(chǎn)品符合適用的產(chǎn)品要求... ...”（第5.1.2條）。理由是，以盡量減少那些想賣到國(guó)外的企業(yè)對(duì)合格評(píng)定（CA）的要求的監(jiān)管負(fù)擔(dān)。雖然世貿(mào)組織成員都投入了相當(dāng)大的努力，在采用和推廣使用各種CA的方法，以降低出口商的遵守成本，這些方案實(shí)際上是貿(mào)易便利化的程度限定了我們的知識(shí)的范圍?，F(xiàn)有的經(jīng)驗(yàn)調(diào)查，這個(gè)問題都集中在一個(gè)特定的方法對(duì)CA - 互認(rèn)協(xié)議（MRAS

5、）。本研究的目的是響應(yīng)的供應(yīng)商的合格聲明（SDOC），另一種工具可用于簡(jiǎn)化了合格評(píng)定程序的貿(mào)易影響的實(shí)證知識(shí)的缺乏。 延長(zhǎng)使用SDOC的情況下，主要是基于信念，它使國(guó)際貿(mào)易更容易避免或消除的負(fù)擔(dān)，否則就會(huì)存在形式的第三方合格評(píng)定的要求。這項(xiàng)研究的重心是一個(gè)以確定是否在貿(mào)易流量，以支持這個(gè)信念發(fā)現(xiàn)經(jīng)驗(yàn)證據(jù)的嘗試：由一套SDOC介紹的個(gè)案研究，并確定是否有增加的貿(mào)易，以下推出的統(tǒng)計(jì)證據(jù)。 個(gè)案研究，包括整個(gè)歐洲聯(lián)盟從“新辦法”付諸實(shí)施在1985年和21世紀(jì)初之間的技術(shù)協(xié)調(diào)和標(biāo)準(zhǔn)化的統(tǒng)一的SDOC引進(jìn)。調(diào)查的產(chǎn)品屬于三個(gè)部門 - 無線電和電信終端設(shè)備（RTTE），醫(yī)療器械和機(jī)械 - 新方

6、法指令在整個(gè)歐盟市場(chǎng)建立一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的SDOC系統(tǒng)。這些案件之一 --- RTTE - 可以被認(rèn)為是比別人“素凈”，SDOC變化可以追溯到一個(gè)特定的時(shí)間點(diǎn)，在沒有其他重大變化被引進(jìn)的時(shí)候。其他兩起案件涉及到SDOC發(fā)生變化，同時(shí)與其他協(xié)調(diào)一致的措施，特別是引進(jìn)在整個(gè)歐盟地區(qū)的統(tǒng)一標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。 估計(jì)過渡到SDOC的影響，顯示了對(duì)進(jìn)口到歐盟市場(chǎng)的積極作用。結(jié)果略有不同跨越來源國(guó)的群體，但支持這一觀點(diǎn)，SDOC可能會(huì)導(dǎo)致供應(yīng)商提高效率，使出口市場(chǎng)更容易 - 從而促進(jìn)貿(mào)易。 作為背景的實(shí)證分析，文件解釋了使用SDOC的預(yù)期效益等特點(diǎn)，定義SDOC制度的理由，也承認(rèn)適用于有效地利用其在公眾利益的監(jiān)管工

7、具的先決條件。 傳聞證據(jù)，并采取技術(shù)壁壘的貿(mào)易在世界貿(mào)易組織委員會(huì)（TBT）的討論表明，在SDOC有廣泛的興趣，還有其使用的強(qiáng)大的理論論證，但偶爾懷疑SDOC的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響的真正程度。 廠商預(yù)期變化的CA制度由強(qiáng)制性的第三方合格評(píng)定SDOC，作為技術(shù)法規(guī)的證明，結(jié)果批準(zhǔn)降低成本，縮短產(chǎn)品上市時(shí)間，并可能降低產(chǎn)品價(jià)格。事實(shí)上， SDOC的理論好處是可以相當(dāng)大的。 然而，實(shí)際節(jié)省成本可能會(huì)遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于預(yù)期的原因。 因素，可以限制從SDOC向制造商增大的利益，包括因各種原因的作用，越來越多的客戶驅(qū)動(dòng)的私人認(rèn)證計(jì)劃和供應(yīng)商的決定，自愿繼續(xù)依靠外部服務(wù)的合格認(rèn)證的某些方面。 同樣重

8、要的是，遵從成本可以降低，因此可以預(yù)計(jì)SDOC引進(jìn)對(duì)貿(mào)易的影響的方法，也有做（一）SDOC取代CA的政權(quán)和具體特點(diǎn)（二）SDOC的具體特點(diǎn)。兩者都可以有所不同。 SDOC要求經(jīng)常在其復(fù)雜性方面不同，它可以改變生產(chǎn)者的利益。也取決于貿(mào)易和更廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)影響SDOC的CA政權(quán)預(yù)先在合適的位置：凡SDOC取代的政權(quán)，其中包括強(qiáng)制性合格評(píng)定，然后前政權(quán)更加繁重，更大的應(yīng)該是“開放”SDOC效果。這里考察的三個(gè)部門，國(guó)家CA制度，歐盟統(tǒng)一的SDOC系統(tǒng)所取代，平均，更具限制性。然而，有歐盟成員國(guó)以前的CA要求的情況下更加繁重。不同類型的前政權(quán)SDOC的貿(mào)易效應(yīng)實(shí)證研究也應(yīng)以在這項(xiàng)研究的仔細(xì)調(diào)查為經(jīng)驗(yàn)

9、。 轉(zhuǎn)到SDOC談到SDOC的貿(mào)易影響的分析，其中潛在的供應(yīng)商是位于也不測(cè)試實(shí)驗(yàn)室或認(rèn)證機(jī)構(gòu)的地理位置的基礎(chǔ)上，國(guó)家之間都沒有歧視。因此，所有的供應(yīng)商，本地和外地的，應(yīng)該受益。不過，也有“額外”的好處，SDOC制度的優(yōu)勢(shì)，只適用于居住外SDOC市場(chǎng)的實(shí)際或潛在的供應(yīng)商，這應(yīng)該引起他們出口更多的SDOC市場(chǎng)。此外在歐盟SDOC引進(jìn)的情況下，有一個(gè)統(tǒng)一的效果，以前分段歐盟成員國(guó)市場(chǎng)，各自有不同的監(jiān)管要求，轉(zhuǎn)變成一個(gè)單一的綜合市場(chǎng)主體的新的共同SDOC制度。效果的統(tǒng)一，促進(jìn)規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)，應(yīng)加強(qiáng)在同一方向的SDOC效果，即增加進(jìn)口流量。但SDOC相當(dāng)于一個(gè)政權(quán)是在一個(gè)特定的歐盟市場(chǎng)已經(jīng)到位之前，歐共

10、體的SDOC主動(dòng)，節(jié)約成本，可以預(yù)期要少，因此進(jìn)口上升少。 實(shí)證調(diào)查的重點(diǎn)是兩個(gè)問題：1）是否過渡到SDOC已經(jīng)推動(dòng)歐盟進(jìn)口和2）是否在SDOC中觀察到的任何差異的影響各個(gè)歐盟成員國(guó)的 “進(jìn)口可以被歸結(jié)到了這些國(guó)家的性質(zhì)”以前的CA制度。 使用重力模型進(jìn)行定量分析。要回答第一個(gè)問題，赫克曼兩階段估計(jì)程序應(yīng)用到個(gè)別的歐盟市場(chǎng)的雙邊進(jìn)口流量。赫克曼程序第一款估計(jì)國(guó)家對(duì)貿(mào)易的概率的一個(gè)選擇過程，然后使用此信息在第二估計(jì)在現(xiàn)有的積極的貿(mào)易流量的影響。在這項(xiàng)研究中，伙伴國(guó)家的其他歐盟成員國(guó)，以及一個(gè)非歐盟國(guó)家，進(jìn)一步分成經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織和12個(gè)非經(jīng)合組織國(guó)家（發(fā)展中國(guó)家）。進(jìn)口包括屬于電信

11、和無線電設(shè)備，機(jī)械和醫(yī)療器械行業(yè)，而我們知道歐共體的SDOC制度是可適用的。由SDOC未涉及的某些產(chǎn)品也包括在內(nèi)，作為對(duì)照組的產(chǎn)品。對(duì)照組的產(chǎn)品，再加上使用列入三個(gè)對(duì)照組的國(guó)家（澳大利亞，日本和美國(guó)）誰沒有落實(shí)政策的變化發(fā)生在歐盟的時(shí)間SDOC，確保到SDOC無關(guān)的決定因素 - 尤其是整個(gè)歐盟的協(xié)調(diào)SDOC引進(jìn)和其他規(guī)范性的變化體現(xiàn)在歐共體指令引入SDOC - 有足夠的控制模型中的任何進(jìn)入歐盟市場(chǎng)的進(jìn)口流量的顯著變化，可以歸結(jié)為切換到SDOC的制度。 盡管機(jī)械是處在一個(gè)薄弱的情況下，所有三個(gè)部門的研究結(jié)果證實(shí)，SDOC使貿(mào)易更加容易。他們還表明，雖然SDOC適用于所有生產(chǎn)者不受歧視，無論

12、他們的位置，實(shí)際影響在整個(gè)出口國(guó)家的不同群體的不同。 同樣的泊松回歸分析應(yīng)用于機(jī)械進(jìn)口的調(diào)查分為四個(gè)主要市場(chǎng) - 德國(guó)，英國(guó)，法國(guó)和意大利。在各自的預(yù)-SDOC德國(guó)和英國(guó)的制度，會(huì)導(dǎo)致我們期望一致，進(jìn)入德國(guó)進(jìn)口顯著增加，而SDOC被發(fā)現(xiàn)有英國(guó)進(jìn)口沒有影響。法國(guó)和意大利的信息基礎(chǔ)預(yù)測(cè)是不可用的，但SDOC的強(qiáng)烈積極的邊際效應(yīng)，被機(jī)器進(jìn)口商觀察到是否市場(chǎng)會(huì)與更繁重的預(yù)-SDOC的第三方認(rèn)證類型制度相一致。 Technical Barriers to Trade ABSTRACT Since the WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers t

13、o Trade (TBT) came into force, Members have invested considerable efforts in adopting and promoting the use of measures intended to reduce conformity assessment (CA) related barriers to trade. Our knowledge of the impact of specific trade facilitating programmers. in the CA field is limited so far,

14、making empirical studies of their trade impact desirable. This study investigates the impact of Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SDOC) on trade flows. As under SDOC regimes suppliers themselves provide written assurance of conformity to applicable technical regulations of a market, the costs of

15、 compliance are assumed to be smaller than for CA regimes requiring certification by third parties. The study focuses on three cases of SDOC introduction in the European Union covering eligible products from the medical devices, telecommunications equipment and machinery sectors. The paper explains

16、 the rationale for using SDOC, expected benefits and design characteristics of SDOC regimes. The quantitative analysis uses a gravity model and finds compelling evidence that the introduction of SDOC in the EU was a factor that influenced the evolution of import flows into EU markets positively. Int

17、ra-EU trade flows and imports from extra-EU OECD countries increased for SDOC-eligible radio and telecommunications equipment and low-risk medical devices, whereas the results for machinery are ambiguous. The most striking increases, visible in all three sectors, are found for exports to EU markets

18、from non-OECD (developing) countries included in the sample. Analysis of the effect of SDOC for selected individual EU members furthermore suggest that the magnitude of effect depends on the nature of the CA regime that SDOC replaced. Product requirements can vary greatly from market to marke

19、t, and it is the responsibility of suppliers to prove that applicable requirements are met. For some products, there must be an assessment of a manufacturer’s conformity by a regulatory agency or a recognised certification body. For other products, a written declaration of conformity by the supplier

20、 himself is sufficient. The endpoint is issuance of a certificate or declaration of conformity. The WTO Agreement on TBT provides that “…conformity assessment procedures shall not be applied more strictly than necessary to give adequate confidence that products conform with the applicable product

21、 requirements …” (Article 5.1.2). The rationale is to minimise the regulatory burden that conformity assessment (CA) requirements pose for firms that wish to sell abroad. While WTO Members have invested considerable efforts in adopting and promoting the use of various CA approaches to lowering expor

22、ters’ compliance costs, our knowledge of the extent to which these programmes actually facilitate trade is limited. Available empirical investigations of this question have focused on one particular approach to CA - Mutual Recognition Agreements (MRAs). The aim of this study is to respond to the lac

23、k of empirical knowledge of the trade effects of Supplier’s Declaration of Conformity (SDOC), another tool available for simplifying the conformity assessment process. The case for extending the use of SDOC is based largely on the belief that it makes international trade easier, by avoiding or el

24、iminating burdens which would otherwise exist in the form of requirements for third-party conformity assessment. The heart of this study is an attempt to determine whether empirical evidence can be found in trade flows to support that belief: by examining a set of cases where SDOC was introduced, an

25、d determining whether there is statistical evidence of increased trade following its introduction. The cases studied consist of the harmonised introduction of SDOC throughout the European Union resulting from the “New Approach” to technical harmonisation and standardisation put into effect betwee

26、n 1985 and the early 2000s. The products investigated belong to three sectors – radio and telecommunications terminal equipment (RTTE), medical devices and machinery – for which the New Approach Directives established a uniform SDOC system throughout the EU market. One of these cases – RTTE – can be

27、 considered to be “purer” than the others, in the sense that the change to SDOC can be traced to a particular point in time at which no other major changes were introduced. The two other cases involve changes to SDOC that occurred simultaneously with other harmonised measures, notably the introducti

28、on of harmonised standards across the EU region. Estimation of the impact of the transition to SDOC shows a positive effect on imports into EU markets. Results vary somewhat across groups of source countries but support the view that SDOC can lead to efficiency gains for suppliers and render expo

29、rting to a market easier – hence facilitate trade. As background to the empirical analysis, the paper explains the rationale for using SDOC, expected benefits and other characteristics defining SDOC regimes, acknowledging also preconditions applicable to its effective use as a regulatory tool in

30、the public interest. Anecdotal evidence and the discussions taking place in the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) indicate that there is widespread interest in SDOC, and strong theoretical arguments for its use, but occasional doubts about the real extent of SDOC’s economic impac

31、t. Manufacturers expect a change of CA regime from mandatory third-party conformity assessment to SDOC, as proof of compliance with technical regulations, to result in reduced costs for approval, reduced time to market, and potentially lower product prices. Indeed, it appears that the theoretical

32、 benefits of SDOC can be sizeable. Nevertheless, actual cost savings may be much less than anticipated for a number of reasons. Factors that can limit the benefits accruing to manufacturers from SDOC include the growing role of customer-driven private certification schemes and suppliers’ decis

33、ions, for various reasons, to voluntarily continue to rely on external services for some aspects of conformity attestation. Equally important, the ways in which compliance costs can be reduced, and hence the effect that introduction of SDOC can be expected to have on trade, have also to do with (

34、a) the specific characteristics of the CA regime that SDOC replaces and (b) the specific features of SDOC. Both can vary. SDOC requirements frequently differ in their complexity, which can vary the benefits for producers. The trade and broader economic impact of SDOC also depends on the CA regime

35、 previously in place: Where SDOC replaces a regime which includes mandatory conformity assessment, then the more onerous the previous regime, the greater should be the “l(fā)iberalising” effect of SDOC. For the three sectors investigated here, the national CA regimes which the EU’s harmonised SDOC syste

36、m replaced were, on average, more restrictive. There are however instances where EU members’ previous CA requirements were not more onerous. SDOC’s trade effects for different types of prior regimes are also examined empirically in this study. Turning to the analysis of SDOC’s trade effects, SDOC

37、 discriminates neither between countries in which potential suppliers are located nor on the basis of the geographical location of a testing laboratory or certification body. Hence all suppliers, local and foreign, should benefit. However, there are “additional” benefits for the part of the SDOC reg

38、ime’s advantages that apply only to the actual or potential suppliers residing outside the SDOC market, and this should cause them to export more to the SDOC market. In the case of EU introduction of SDOC there is furthermore a harmonisation effect that transforms formerly segmented EU member market

39、s, each having different regulatory requirements, into a single integrated market subject to the new common SDOC regime. The effect of harmonisation is to promote economies of scale, which should reinforce the SDOC effect in the same direction, i.e., increase the flow of imports. But where a regime

40、equivalent to SDOC was already in place in a specific EU market prior to the EC’s SDOC initiative, cost savings can be expected to be less and consequently imports to rise by less. The focus of the empirical investigation is on two questions: 1) whether transition to SDOC has promoted EU imports

41、and 2) whether any observable differences in SDOC’s influence on individual EU members’ imports can be attributed to the nature of those countries’ previous CA regimes. The quantitative analysis is performed using a gravity model. To answer the first question, the two-stage Heckman estimation pro

42、cedure is applied to bilateral import flows into individual EU markets. The Heckman procedure first models a selection process estimating the probability that a country-pair will trade, and then uses this information in a second estimation of impact on existing positive trade flows. In this study, p

43、artner countries are other EU members as well as a set of non-EU countries, divided further into OECD and 12 non-OECD (developing) countries. Imports consist of products belonging to the telecom and radio equipment, machinery and medical devices sectors for which we know the EC’s SDOC regime became

44、applicable. Certain products not covered by SDOC are also included, as control group products. Use of control group products, plus the inclusion of three control group countries (Australia, Japan and the United States) who did not implement SDOC at the time the policy change occurred in the EU, ensu

45、res that determinants unrelated to SDOC – notably harmonisation across EU of SDOC introduction and other regulatory changes embodied in the EC directives introducing SDOC – are adequately controlled for in the model and any significant changes in import flows into EU markets can be attributed to the

46、 regime switch to SDOC. Despite machinery being a weak case, the results for all three sectors confirm that SDOC has made trade easier. They also show that although SDOC applies without discrimination to all producers, regardless of their location, the actual impact has varied across the differen

47、t groups of export countries. The same Poisson regression analysis is applied to the investigation of machinery imports into four major markets – Germany, the UK, France and Italy. Consistent with what the respective pre-SDOC regimes of Germany and the UK would lead us to expect, imports into Ger

48、many show a significant increase whereas SDOC is found to have no effect on UK imports. Information underpinning predictions for France and Italy was unavailable, but the strongly positive marginal effects of SDOC observed for machinery imports into either market would be consistent with more burdensome pre-SDOC regimes of the third-party certification type.